Book Project

Networked Borders: The Post-9/11 Transformation of Border Governance

Working Papers

1. "Networked Trust: Global Policing and the Politics of Securing Trade." Conditionally Accepted at the American Political Science Review (APSR).
   
   Abstract: States routinely exchange sensitive information to manage issues of mutual concern, but doing so entails the risk that partners defect from the terms of the arrangement, which can deter cooperation from occurring to begin with. Existing research emphasizes the palliative role of international organizations in mitigating this dilemma. This article argues instead that, in domains characterized by secrecy, government agencies may instead rely on their existing social networks to determine who to trust with sensitive information. I develop and probe this theory of "networked trust'' in the context of cooperation among border agencies to secure global trade. The findings, based on an inferential network analysis using original data on bilateral agreements that regularize the exchange of criminal intelligence between customs agencies, combined with elite interviews, show how specific features of the social context in which dyads are embedded may provide valuable information that mitigates mistrust and facilitates cooperation. The argument advances our understanding of how informal networks may facilitate cooperation when formal oversight and enforcement are limited.   
   
   
2. "Peer Pressure and the Competitive Diffusion of Trusted Trader Agreements." Conditionally Accepted at International Studies Quarterly (ISQ).
   
   ​Abstract: States increasingly cooperate to regulate the movement of goods moving through global supply chains. One way they do so is through little-studied agreements that mutually recognize each other’s “trusted traders” —firms certified as low-risk and entitled to expedited passage across borders. Since 2007, 49 countries have signed 148 trusted trader agreements worldwide. Why and how have these agreements proliferated?  I argue that states sign trusted trader agreements under competitive pressures to avoid costly time delays at borders, and that those pressures are conditioned by the quantity and composition of a state’s existing third-party ties. I evaluate this network theory of competitive diffusion using newly assembled data and an event history model. The paper advances work on policy diffusion by demonstrating how network structure endogenously reconfigures strategic incentives. 
   
   
3. "Spy and Tell? The Persuasive Power of Publicizing State Secrets" (with Lee-Or Ankori Karlinsky and Martin Naunov)​​​​​​. Under Review.
   
   Abstract:  Does the revelation of state secrets help generate a resolved public? Governments increasingly declassify and publicize intelligence to rally public support for costly foreign policy, including military action. Yet the disclosure of intelligence carries well-known risks---compromising sources and methods---while its potential benefits are uncertain. We argue that revealing secrets manufactures resolve by lending claims unique credibility, which could come from the information itself, its secrecy, its state source, or the act of formal authorization. We test this theory in a two-stage survey experiment (N=4000), where we vary whether and how information reaches the public—through an authorized disclosure, a leak, a private firm, or a think tank—to find out whether intelligence disclosures are especially persuasive. We further ask whether disclosure narrows partisan gaps in cue responsiveness and whether its persuasiveness depends on trust in the intelligence community. The study offers key insights about elite persuasion, resolve, and secrecy in international politics.
   
   
4. "The Distributive Consequences of Regime Complexity: Evidence from Multilateral Climate Finance" (with Ayse Kaya)​​. Preparing for submission. 
   
   ​Abstract: Global governance increasingly operates through regime complexes, where multiple international institutions operate within single issue areas. Existing scholarship explains how these complexes emerge and how they shape cooperation, but says far less about how their structure shapes who benefits from the goods regimes provide. We conceptualize regime complexes as networks of interacting IOs and argue that exposure to well-connected IOs supplies states with network capital — informational and relational advantages that improve access to regime-provided goods. Using original data on multilateral climate finance from 2010–2021, we show that recipients with greater prior exposure to well-connected donor IOs (hubs) and to IOs bridging otherwise disconnected donor groups (brokers) subsequently receive more climate finance. Effects are largest for poorer recipients, for whom network capital appears to substitute for limited domestic capacity to navigate a an intricate governance landscape. By bridging literatures on social network analysis and regime complexity, we show how the shifting topology of inter-IO cooperation shapes important distributive outcomes.

Works in Progress

• "Whose Border? Public Reception of Foreign-Supplied Border Infrastructure"
  
  
• "Great Power Rivalry and Border Technology"
  
  
• "Does Risk Based Border Control Work? A Global Field Experiment"​
  
  
• ​"Police Assistance as Soft Power?" 
  
  
• "The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Police Assistance" (with Lin Sae-Phoo)​

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